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ARTICLE 
ECONOMIC JUSTICE AND WELFARE 
REFORM: WAS WELFARE REFORM AN 
EXAMPLE OF PRUDENTIAL JUDGMENT 
IN PUBLIC POLICY? 
CHARLES M. A. CLARK* 
After extensive discussion and debate, President Bill Clinton signed 
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, re-
placing AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependant Children)1 with TANF 
(Temporary Assistance for Needy Families). 2 The push to end "welfare as 
we know it"3 was fueled by a desire to reduce the costs of welfare programs 
as well as to reduce the dependency allegedly created by the existing sys-
tem. Many of the goals T ANF sought to achieve-particularly reducing the 
welfare caseloads and increasing the labor market participation of single 
mothers-were achieved, as both of these statistics improved dramatically 
from 1996 to 2000. However, the record since 2001 is less impressive. 
There is considerable argument as to whether the success of the late 1990s 
was due to Welfare Reform (and other policy changes, such as increases in 
the Earned Income Tax Credit) or whether the booming economy and low 
unemployment rates produced these changes.4 
Often missed in this discussion is the more important issue of how the 
poor were affected. Neither the reduction of the size of the welfare rolls or 
the increase in the labor market participation of single parents can be con-
* Associate Dean and Professor of Economics, Tobin College of Business, and Senior Fel-
low, Vincentian Center for Church and Society, St. John's University, Jamaica, NY. I would like 
to thank Janice Peterson for her assistance and advice. 
l. The program Aid to Dependant Children (ADC) was part of the Social Security Act of 
1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935). It was renamed Aid to Families with Dependant 
Children (AFDC) in 1960. 
2. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). 
3. William I. Clinton, Acceptance Speech to the Democratic National Convention (July 16, 
1992), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulshownomination. php?convi.d=7. 
4. Rebecca M. Blank, Evaluating Welfare Reform in the United States, 40 J. BeON. LITERA. 
TURE 1105 (2002) (providing an overview of this debate). 
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sidered excellent goods; they are at best instrumental goods.s The excellent 
good we need to pursue in anti-poverty programs is an improvement in the 
lives and well-being of the poor. It is more than a reduction in the statistics 
used to measure poverty. 
Statistics like the welfare caseloads are indicators; they are not the 
reality. The size of the welfare caseload only tells us part of the story.6 The 
"welfare caseload" is merely a statistic that indicates how many are getting 
needed public assistance. Its increase, or its decrease, could be good or it 
could be bad. A rising welfare caseload could mean better methods of iden-
tifying need, which would mean more poor people are better off and would 
be a good thing; it could also mean an increase in actual need for the pro-
gram, which would mean things have gotten worse for the poor. Further-
more, a reduction in the numbers receiving public assistance could be due 
to harsh rules that make getting assistance difficult or impossible, thus ex-
cluding many who are eligible (which would be bad), or due to an improved 
economy, thus reducing the number of people who need public assistance 
(which would be good). 
Prudential judgment7 is critical for public policy formation because it 
links policy analysis toward the valid goal of public policy-the common 
good. In evaluating welfare reform as an example of prudential judgment in 
public policy we need to look not only at the policy change and its results, 
but also the logic underlying the policy and the policy's purpose. It matters 
whether the goal was to reduce the numbers on public assistance (and re-
duce the costs) or rather to reduce the numbers who needed public assis-
tance. Furthermore, whether the logic behind the policy was based on sound 
reasoning also matters. These are the issues I will address in this article. 
Prudential judgment is based on the goals toward which one strives 
and the values underlying these goals. Prudential judgment is also based on 
the understanding of the situation one is facing, particularly the causes of 
the problems and the functioning of the system one hopes to affect or 
change. It is rightly considered an ally of practical reasoning. Even if the 
goal was merely reduction of the numbers on the welfare caseloads, and 
thus the burden on taxpayers, it must be considered a false prudence, for it 
might have successfully achieved its desired end, but its end could not be 
5. An excellent good is one that is worth pursuing for its own sake. whereas an instrumental 
good. like money, is valued based on its assistance in obtaining excellent goods. 
6. The same can be said for statistics like Gross Domestic Product (GDP); it is well known 
that crime and natural disasters often increase GDP, but that does not make either crime or natural 
disasters good. For an overview of the relationship between GDP and well-being, see generally 
Charles M. A. Clark & Catherine Kavanagh, Progress. Values and Economic Indicators. in PRo-
GRESS. VALUES AND PuBLIC POLICY 60 (Sean Healy & Brigid Reynolds eds., 1996). 
7. Prudential judgment refers not only to choosing the best means to an end. but also adds 
the requirement that the right end has been chosen. THOMAS AQUINAS. SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Part 
I of the Second Part, q. 57. a. 5 (in vol. 2 of Fathers of the English DOIninican Province trans., 
Christian Classics 1981). 
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considered a desirable goal of a just public policy. Lowering the number of 
people on public assistance is only a valid goal if it is achieved by reducing 
the number of people in need of public assistance.8 
My argument is that based on goals and values that are not aligned 
with right reason, and based on an incorrect understanding of the causes of 
the problem, welfare reform did not achieve the all-important goal of equity 
in public policy, particularly in relation to the poor; thus it must be deemed 
an imprudent policy experiment. I will fIrst examine the views of economic 
justice underlying economic policy, specifically a comparison of the idea 
and ideal of economic justice in neoclassical economic theory with that of 
Catholic Social Thought. As stated above, prudential judgment in economic 
policy-making requires working toward justice in the economy, so the con-
ception of economic justice is an important issue. In the second section of 
the paper, I will look at the issue of prudential judgment in general and 
political prudential judgment in particular; I will argue that the proper mode 
of reasoning is practical and not theoretical, and further that the Welfare 
Reform proposal was based on theoretical reasoning to the exclusion of 
practical reasoning. The third section of the paper examines the problem of 
poverty in America and the evidence of the impact of welfare reform. Fi-
nally, the last section evaluates the prudence and justice of welfare reform 
as an anti-poverty program. 
I. COMPETING VIEWS OF EcONOMIC JUSTICE 
Justice is essential to a well-functioning economy. As Adam Smith 
noted: 
Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any 
state which does not enjoy a regular administration of justice, in 
which the people do not feel themselves secure in the possession 
of their property, in which the faith of contracts is not supported 
by law, and in which the authority of the state is not supposed to 
be regularly employed in enforcing the payment of debts from all 
those who are able to pay.9 
Yet, justice is more than law and order, more than the protection of 
private property, and more than the enforcement of contracts. Justice is also 
8. Otherwise it must be seen as a modem version of Thomas Robert Malthus's eighteenth 
century suggestion for reducing the numbers in poverty and avoiding famine conditions if other 
methods of controlling the population of the poor were unsuccessful: 
Instead of recommending cleanliness to the poor, we should encourage contrary habits. 
In our towns we should make the streets narrower, crowd more people into the houses, 
and court the return of the plague. In the country, we should build our villages near 
stagnant pools. and particularly encourage settlements in all marshy and unwholesome 
situations. 
THOMAS ROBERT MALTHUS, AN EsSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION 127 (5th ed. 1817) 
(1798). 
9. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
862 (Edwin Cannan ed .• Random House 1937) (1776) [hereinafter SMmI, WEALTH OF NATIONS]. 
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the desire to do what is just in our relations with others as both individuals 
and the community as a whole. Justice is giving others what is their due-
that is, to be fair and equitable in our dealing with others. Following St. 
Thomas Aquinas, we can divide justice into three types.lO Justice between 
individuals is called Commutative Justice, which, in economics, is justice in 
exchangeY The relations between the group as a whole and the individual 
is the category of Distributive Justice-"justice in apportioning out propor-
tionately what is common."12 The third type of justice is Legal Justice, in 
which individuals are directed toward actions that promote the common 
good. Today we can call this Social Justice. 
A. Three considerations in Economic Justice 
Economic justice considers each of these types of justice in the eco-
nomic realm of our lives-our purely economic actions, as well as our po-
litical, social, cultural, and religious actions that have economic impact. It 
also is concerned with the outcomes of the economy as a whole. The eco-
nomic realm of social life is delineated by that which relates to the solving 
of the economic problem-of how societies provide for .their material re-
production. This is commonly divided into the three questions each society 
must answer in addressing the economic problem: What to produce? How 
to carry out production? And to whom to distribute the benefits of produc-
tion? As every economics student knows, there are three types of solutions 
to the economic problem: tradition, command, and market. Yet, in the real 
world, most economies have a mixture of all three solutions, with justice 
playing a fundamental role in each. 13 
1. Commutative Justice 
The importance of commutative justice for the efficient operation of a 
market economy is partly, as Adam Smith noted, in the protection of private 
property and the enforcement of contracts that allows for free exchange; but 
it is also the backbone of the necessary moral underpinning that provides 
self-control and thus allows exchanges that are not completely under the 
control and regulation of the State. As Adam Smith notes in The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, individuals have a natural interest in the well-being of 
others and this causes them, for the most part, to restrain their actions so as 
10. See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGlCA, Part II o/the Second Part, q. 61 (in vol. 2 
of Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1981). 
1 t. Id. 
12. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOOlAE: A CONCISE TRANSLATION 387 (Timothy 
McDermontt ed. & trans., 1991) [hereinafter, AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOOIAE: CONCISE]. 
13. Neoclassical economics offers a different definition of the economic problem, based on 
its different conception of justice, both of which are based on neoclassical economics' understand-
ing of the human person. For more on the economic problem and questions of ethics see Charles 
M. A. Clark, Catholic Social Thought and the Economic Problem, J. ETHICS & Soc. SCI. 6-18 
(200 I), available at http://www.pust.eduloikonomiaipages/febb20001Clark.htrn. 
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to not cause harm.14 These moral sentiments, which only develop through 
social interaction, are a necessary precondition for a society that solves the 
economic problem with considerable market mechanisms. That is, freedom 
in our everyday economic actions is based on self-control (derived from 
tradition, which in this context refers to learning social norms and morals) 
and on external control for those who violate social norms (often done 
through the state). Markets by themselves are never enough to coordinate 
individual economic actions toward the common good because they do not 
produce the values (or the self-control which comes from socialization) 
necessary for markets to function efficiently. 
2. Distributive Justice 
Distributive justice is also of primary importance for the functioning of 
the economy. It addresses the question of how to distribute the benefits of 
economic activity in the economic problem. How the "economic pie" is 
divided is important for many economic reasons. Distribution determines 
how much of current economic output goes to different individuals and sec-
tors of society. This leads directly to the issue of sufficiency, for if individu-
als or groups are not receiving a share of social output that is enough for 
them to meet their needs adequately, then they will necessarily become less 
productive, thus affecting future output. Furthermore, distribution provides 
incentives for current economic activity, which also influences future 
production. 
Past poverty is the major cause of current poverty levels. Individuals 
and families who suffer material need will not develop to their potential, 
thus having long-term effects at the micro and macro levels. Inadequate 
education and health care for the poor cause permanent reductions in their 
future productivity. Thus, we should not be surprised that, as adults, those 
who where raised in poverty typically do not compete successfully with 
adults who were not poor as children. The preferential option for the poor 
recognizes that context matters, that individuals cannot be held fully re-
sponsible for context, and that contexts that create exclusions and barriers 
hurt everyone. 
14. See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (Oxford Univ. Press 1976) 
(1759) [hereinafter SMITH, THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS]. The conflict between Smith's sym-
pathy principle as the guiding force for human behavior in THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS and 
the role of self-interest as a guiding principle in the WEALTH OF NATIONS has been a contentious 
issue among historians of economics. However, if the two books are viewed as one large work, as 
was intended, then the socialization process in THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, guided by the 
sympathy principle, is necessary in order to produce self-controlling individuals who can have the 
freedom to pursue their self-interest in their economic lives as discussed in WEALTH OF NATIONS. 
See id.; SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 9. 
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3. Social Justice 
The importance of social justice cannot be underestimated for the well-
ordering of the economy. Justice requires "right relations,"15 and so the 
economy needs structures and institutions that promote right relations. If the 
economy is lacking in such structures and institutions-if most relations are 
not right relations-then the interactions between individuals, including the 
economic interactions, will be less productive and more cumbersome. As 
economists would say, there would have to be high transaction costs, with 
considerable effort wasted on non-productive activities. Adam Smith's criti-
cism of the institution of slavery is a good example of this issue. He noted 
that the institution generated inefficient levels of effort by the slaves, as it 
was perfectly rational for each individual slave to do the minimum amount 
of work (there being no benefit to doing more). Society benefits when there 
are institutions that promote getting the most benefit out of its resources, 
not the least. 
Economic justice deals with the justice of economic actions and out-
comes. How one defines economic justice will be determined by one's 
overall definition of justice, which will, in turn, be based on one's concep-
tion of human nature and society. The underlying economic logic behind 
welfare reform was neoclassical economic theory, but our critique of wel-
fare reform is based on the conception of justice that underlies Catholic 
Social Thought. Thus, before we can proceed, we must compare these two 
systems of thought. We are not comparing them as two competing eco-
nomic theories, as our interest is in their differing conceptions of justice. 
Furthermore, since Catholic Social Thought is not an economic theory and 
"has no [economic] models to present,"16 we cannot offer such a compari-
son. Catholic Social Thought does, however, offer the necessary philosoph-
ical foundations upon which the ideal and goals are based, as well as a set 
of principles to guide and inform economic actions. Thus it is very valuable 
for the necessary prudential judgments, especially the public prudential 
judgments that make up much of economic activity. Of course, this moral 
compass is not enough. In order to make correct prudential judgments-that 
is, to make choices in line with right reason and promote the common 
good-one must also have a useful and accurate understanding of the cur-
rent situation in its historical and social context (memory and intelligence), 
and a useful and accurate model upon which to estimate the ramifications of 
one's actions (reason and foresight). 
15. Right relations are those human interactions that respect the natural rights and duties of 
each person. 
16. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, No. 43 (May I, 1991), available at http://www. 
vatican. valholy _father/john_pauUilencyclicaIs/documentslhfjp-i_enc_O 1 0519913entesimus-
annus3n.html. 
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B. Economic Justice According to Neoclassical Economic Theory 
While neoclassical economic theory purports to be a "positive" sci-
ence, and thus free of value judgments, the fact of the matter is that it is a 
"normative" system based on values and value judgments. I? Many of these 
values and value judgments are part of the philosophical preconceptions 
upon which the theory is based. Most important for our purposes are the 
values that form the basis of its understanding of human nature and society. 
1. Neoclassical Values-Rational Economic Man 
Neoclassical economic theory starts with an anthropology which is 
often summed up under the heading of "rational economic man."IS It is a 
view of the person as an individual and not as a person. I9 Persons require 
others with whom to be in relation; individuals can be autonomous and 
exist not in community, but in opposition to others. Thus, we should not be 
surprised that many neoclassical economic theories start with a Robinson 
Crusoe story, for they argue it is an example of autonomous decision 
making. 
This "rational economic man" model requires that individuals are au-
tonomous; they are only influenced by their preferences (no social influ-
ences are allowed) and thus are driven solely by their narrow self-interest.2o 
Furthermore, their self-interests are to maximize their consumption of util-
ity. The model of the person is perfectly utilitarian, seeking pleasure and 
avoiding pain, with all actions based on a "rational" calculation of costs and 
benefits. From this view of human nature, the theory develops a view of 
society as an equilibrium system that is merely the result of the individual 
self-interested actions of all members of a society. Society as a collective or 
as a whole does not exist; it is a mere mental fiction. 21 Thus neoclassical 
economics does not allow any historical or social factors into its theoretical 
structure.22 
17. See GUNNAR MYRDAL, THE POLmcAL ELEMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC 
THEORY (Harvard Univ. Press 1961) (1954). 
18. See JOHN B. DAVIS, THE THEORY OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN EcONOMICS: IDENTITY AND 
VALUE 1-20 (2003); MARTIN HOLLIS & EDWARD NELL, RATIONAL ECONOMIC MAN: A PHILO-
SOPHICAL CRmQUE OF NEO-CLASSICAL EcONOMICS 47-64 (1975). 
19. For the distinction between individuality and personality, see JACQUES MARITAlN, THE 
PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD 31-46 (John J. Fitzgerald trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 
1985) (1947). 
20. By "narrow self-interest," I mean a self-interest that does not and cannot include the 
interest of others. 
21. WERNER STARK, ThE FUNDAMENTAL FORMS OF SOCIAL THOUGHT 26 (1963) (highlight-
ing how the neoclassical view of the human person necessarily leads to a view of society as a 
mental fiction). 
22. For an analysis of the elimination of historical and social context from the neoclassical 
economic theory research program see CHARLES M. A. CLARK, EcONOMIC THEORY AND NATURAL 
PHILOSOPHY 145-69 (1992). 
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2. Neoclassical Justice-Preeminence of Market Outcomes 
Commutative justice in neoclassical economics is determined by the 
voluntariness of exchange. As long as exchange is voluntary it satisfies 
commutative justice. Our "self interest" assumption prevents the possibility 
of individuals making a trade that is not in their best interests (and the 
perfect information assumption prevents any mistakes).23 Its conception of 
distributive justice is provided by the marginal productivity theory of distri-
bution, which states, in the words of John Bates Clark (the originator of this 
theory), that "[t]he distribution of the income of society is controlled by a 
natural law, and that this law, if it worked without friction, would give 
every agent of production the amount of wealth which that agent created."24 
Social justice in the neoclassical model is provided by the concept of 
Pareto optimality-a state in which no further beneficial trades are possible 
that will make at least one individual better off without making at least one 
individual worse off. As one neoclassical economist stated: "The Pareto 
optimum that a competitive economy seeks to attain is an essentially moral 
goal in that one individual's well-being is not attained at the expense of 
another's well-being. The concept of Pareto optimum, in fact, is a more 
precise definition of the traditional concept of the common good."25 It 
should be noted that what is important about perfectly competitive market 
outcomes is that they maximize consumer surplus (the consumption of util-
ity), while the sole motivation of "rational economic man" is to maximize 
utility. 
C. Economic Justice in Catholic Social Thought 
The concept of economic justice in Catholic Social Thought is decep-
tively simple: economic justice is that which protects the dignity of all per-
sons and promotes the common good. The two primary elements in this 
definition are the assertion that all persons have inherent dignity and the 
assertion of the primacy of promoting the common good. They are also the 
two foundational concepts of all Catholic Social Thought. Pope John Paul II 
best summarized these points: 
The dignity of the human person is a transcendent value, always 
recognized as such by those who sincerely search for the truth. 
Indeed, the whole of human history should be interpreted in the 
light of this certainty. Every person, created in the image and like-
ness of God (cf. Gn 1 :26-28), is therefore radically oriented to-
23. In Walrasian General Equilibrium Theory, which is the core of neoclassical economics, 
this is provided by "re-contracting" -the ability to have a do-over if a false trade is made. See 
generally KENNETH J. ARROW & FRANK H. HAHN, GENERAL COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS (1971). 
24. JOHN BATES CLARK, THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH, at v (1965). 
25. H. S. Houthakker, The Ethics of Markets and Process, in PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR Jus. 
TICE AND PEACE, SOCIAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMICS: A COLLOQUIUM IN THE VATICAN 
65-70 (1992). 
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wards the Creator, and is constantly in relationship with those 
possessed of the same dignity. To promote the good of the indi-
vidual is thus to serve the common good, which is the point where 
rights and duties converge and reinforce one another?6 
1. Catholic Values-Humans as Persons 
9 
The philosophical anthropology of Catholic Social Thought views 
humans as persons and not as isolated individuals. The term "person" goes 
back to the older tradition of persona, which is a unique personality who is 
also a member of a larger group. This is a point of great significance, for 
this differing conception of the human person leads to very different con-
ceptions of society and justice. First, it leads to a definition of the common 
good that is more than just economic. In neoclassical economic theory, the 
common good is maximum consumption given the existing distribution of 
income (which is not discussed in this article). Pope John XXIII defined the 
common good as that which "embraces the sum total of those conditions of 
social living, whereby men are enabled more fully and more readily to 
achieve their own perfection.'>27 As David Hollenbach has noted on Catho-
lic Social Thought, 
The common good is a social reality in which all persons should 
share through their participation in it. It is not simply the arithme-
tic aggregate of individual goods suggested by the utilitarian 
formula 'the greatest good for the greatest number.' In a utilita-
rian understanding, increased aggregate social good (e.g., gross 
national product) is compatible with the exclusion of some per-
sons from participation in it. Emphasis on the participation of all 
in the common good is particularly important.28 
Catholic Social Thought recognizes the centrality of the social nature 
of the human person. Thus, while recognizing the inherent dignity of all 
persons (which comes from our being made in the image and likeness of 
God), Catholic Social Thought notes that human dignity can only be effec-
tively realized via social participation. The flourishing of society and indi-
viduals each depend on the other. 
Man's social nature makes it evident that the progress of the 
human person and the advance of society itself hinge on each 
26. Pope John Paul II, Message for the Celebration of the World Day of Peace, No.2 (Jan. I, 
1999), available at http://www.vatican.valholy _father/john_pauUiJmessages/peacefdocumentslhf 
.Jp-ii_mes_14121998_xxxii-world-day-for -peace3n.html. 
27. Pope Paul VI, Dignitatis Humanae, No.6 (Dec. 7, 1965), available at http://www.vati-
can. vaiarchivelhisCcounciislii_ vatican30unciUdocuments/vat-ii_decl_19651207 _dignitatis-
humanae3n.html; Pope John XIII, Mater et Magistra, No. 65 (May 15, 1961), available at http:// 
www.vatican.valholy 3ather/john_xxiii/encyclicals/documentslhf.J-xxiii_enc_1505196 Lmater_ 
en.htm!. 
28. DAVID HOLLENBACH, THE NEW DICTIONARY OF CATHOUC SOCIAL THOUGHT 193 (Judith 
A. Dwyer ed., 1994). 
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other. From the beginning, the subject, and the goal of all social 
institutions is and must be the human person, which for its part 
and by its very nature stands completely in need of social life. 
This social life is not something added to man. Hence, through his 
dealings with others, through reciprocal duties, and through fra-
ternal dialogue he develops all his gifts and is able to rise to his 
destiny.29 
Defining economic justice in a specific social and historical context, 
however, is much more complicated than this. An economy is "just" when 
both its methods and outcomes fit the definition stated above, but how one 
actually protects human dignity and promotes the common good in an ac-
tual economic setting is never a simple matter. It is not '~ust" when based 
solely on methods or solely on outcomes (there is no separation of means 
and ends). Different economies at different levels of economic development 
will call for very different means to the ends of protecting human dignity 
and promoting the common good. There is no ideal economy independent 
of time and space. While the moral natural law is eternal, economic institu-
tions and practices are a matter of historical and social context. In some 
circumstances the common ownership of land or capital can promote jus-
tice, whereas in others it can be a barrier to a "just economy."30 In the final 
analysis, a '~ust economy" brings people closer together and closer to God. 
It is toward this end that the principles of Catholic Social Thought were 
developed. 
2. Catholic Justice-The Impact of Faith 
Justice in the Catholic Social Thought tradition "is neither the result of 
societal consensus nor of rational deduction or calculation alone. It is rooted 
in a faith tradition that responds to a loving and just God. God's intentions 
for human life determine what is just and what is unjust."31 The ultimate 
measure of justice for the Christian is not contingent on what people 
choose, but is instead revealed through the Gospels and through an under-
standing of the nature of the human person. While Catholic Social 
Thought's view of justice follows in many ways the classical view that 
"justice is giving each their due," its understanding of a person's "due" is 
grounded in the Christian idea of charity and the inherent dignity of the 
29. Pope Paul VI, Gaudium Et Spes, No. 25 (Dec. 7, 1965), available at http://www.vatican. 
vaJarchi velhisccouncils/iL vatican_councilldocuments/vat-ii_cons_1965 1207 ....gaudium-et -spes_ 
en.html. 
30. The voluntary sharing of economic goods in the early Christian church is a move toward 
a just economy and a Christian solution to the economic problem. Yet, the forced socialization of 
the means of production under communism was a clear violation of both the means and ends of a 
'Just economy." 
31. KAREN LEBACQZ, SIX THEORIES OF JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVE FROM PHILOSOPHICAL AND 
THEOLOGICAL EnlIcs 74-75 (1986). 
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human person.32 One of the greatest misunderstandings of a Christian con-
ception of the economy has been the separation of the ideals of justice and 
charity, and the view that they are somehow in opposition. For a Christian, 
they need to be two sides of the same coin. Charity and justice are virtues 
that are co-principles of living a Christian life. Too often they are seen as 
competing virtues, or worse, as alternatives-but each requires the other. It 
is important to remember that Aquinas's theories of justice and charity are 
based on "right relationships" and should not be used piecemeal to legiti-
mate the status quo under the assumption that the status quo is based on 
"right relationships. "33 
Social justice encompasses the conditions in which persons can lead 
moral and happy lives-that is, can fully develop through social participa-
tion toward their "perfection" (understood as becoming more like the God 
in whose image they have been made). It is important to note, as David 
Hollenbach does in Christian Ethics and the Common Good, that Aquinas 
makes a distinction "between the fullness of the common good and aspects 
of the common good that are necessary for social life to exist at all."34 
Although one can argue it is not the role of the state to promote the "full-
ness of the common good," only the most ardent libertarian would hold that 
promoting those aspects necessary for society to exist are legitimately pub-
lic policy issues and should be part of our economic and political discourse. 
We will see that the formulation of Welfare Reform was based on the 
neoclassical views of human nature and justice, which, as we have seen, 
Christians must reject as overly narrow. This, coupled with the exclusive 
use of theoretical reasoning discussed in the next section, helped to create a 
policy experiment which, I will argue, was at best a false prudential 
judgment. 
II. PRUDENTIAL JUDGMENT IN PUBLIC POLICY 
The purpose of the conference for which I wrote this article was pru-
dential judgment in public policy.35 All judgment starts with our under-
standing of the problem or issue at hand. In the case of this article, the issue 
is the existence and persistence of poverty in the richest society humanity 
has ever known. How we understand this issue thus will greatly influence 
our attempts to rectify it, should we decide to do so. In this section I will 
look at whether the underlying logic of welfare reform allowed for, or was 
32. See Pope John Paul II, Redemptor hominis, No. 17 (Mar. 4, 1979), available at 
http:www.vatican.valholy _father/john_pauUilencyclicals/documentslhfjp-ii_enc_04031979_ 
redemptor-hominis_en.html. 
33. See Stephen J. Pope. Overview of the Ethics of Thomas Aquinas. in THE Enncs OF AQUI-
NAS 30. 38 (Stephen J. Pope ed .• 2002). 
34. DAVID HOLLENBACH, THE COMMON GooD AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 192 (2002). 
35. Terence Murphy Institute, Conference: Public Policy. Prudential Judgment and the Cath-
olic Social Tradition (Apr. 6-8, 2006). 
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based on, prudential judgment. Of particular importance is the use of practi-
cal reasoning in addressing the problem of poverty. Thus we need to look 
first at the distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning. 
In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes the important distinction be-
tween theoretical, or scientific reasoning, and practical reasoning. Theoreti-
cal reasoning considers objects or things that cannot be otherwise, things 
that are eternal and invariant.36 Thus, our knowledge of them can be exact 
and precise, as the object of our analysis is unchanging. The natural world 
fits easily into this category, as its rules, the laws of nature, are considered 
fixed and eternal, and the objects are either unchanging or change according 
to set rules that are themselves unchanging. Practical reasoning, however, 
deals with objects that can be otherwise, that are not invariant-where 
choice and discretion play a role in the generation of the object of analysis. 
It is through theoretical reasoning that we discover our ultimate ends 
(which, for the Christian, also come from sacred scripture); practical rea-
soning guides us in pursuing these ends given the various contingencies we 
face in everyday life.37 The distinction between theoretical and practical 
reasoning is important for policy formation because theoretical reasoning 
excludes historical or social context from the analysis, whereas practical 
reasoning emphasizes their importance and inclusion. The form of reason-
ing one uses thus determines which factors will be deemed important and 
which will be ignored. Theoretical reasoning can, and will, ignore the actual 
particular causes of poverty, whereas practical reasoning will build on the 
actual particulars to discover the general causes of poverty. 
Like practical reasoning, prudential judgment also emphasizes particu-
lars, as it is geared toward actual, as apposed to theoretical, problems. "The 
function of prudence is not to set the goals of moral virtue, but simply to 
determine means to those goals. . . . Prudence presupposes the goals of 
moral virtue as general starting-points and determines what to do in particu-
lar."38 Aquinas further notes that the prudence necessary for promoting the 
good of the individual will be different from the prudence that promotes the 
well-being of the family and the State. "The idea that man need only seek 
his own private good conflicts with charity and with right reason, both of 
which prize the general good above all. So men need political prudence 
aiming at the general good and bearing the same relation to legal justice as 
ordinary prudence does to the moral virtues."39 The goals of ordinary, indi-
vidual prudence must be in conformity with the moral virtues (so as to 
promote the well-being of that individual), while the goals of public pru-
dence must be the general or common good. 
36. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 146-73 (Martin Ostwald trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 
1962). 
37. See ALASOAIR MACINTYRE. WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 183-208 (1988). 
38. AQUINAS. SUMMA THEOLOOIAE: CONCISE. supra note 12, at 377. 
39. /d. at 378. 
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Aquinas's analysis of the component parts of prudence highlight both 
the role of historical and social context in understanding the right course of 
action, as well as a clear understanding of the problem one is addressing. 
This is particularly important for understanding social phenomena (such as 
economic outcomes), which are influenced by complex combinations of 
past and current factors, some of which are general and universal and some 
of which are singular and particular-always with the unpredictable ele-
ment of free will and human freedom. If nothing else, prudential judgment 
calls for humility in policy-making, keeping in mind that one cannot know 
or control all the factors that are important. It is the prevalence of uncer-
tainty in the actual economy that requires a clear understanding of both the 
legitimate goals of public policy (the common good), and the current situa-
tion to shape workable and effective public policy.40 Failure to correctly 
diagnose the causes of poverty greatly limits the possible effectiveness of 
any policy which seeks to reduce it. 
III. THE PROBLEM OF POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES41 
During the Great Depression, as President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
noted, "[o]ne third of the nation is ill-fed, ill-housed and ill-clothed."42 
With poverty so widespread, it was clear that both its causes and its solu-
tions needed to be systemic-a change in the system. The New Deal was 
designed to address the economic breakdown, and coupled with the spend-
ing from World War II, it helped lift the economy and millions of citizens 
out of poverty. By the 1950s, America had become an affluent society, with 
poverty being the exception rather than the rule. The 1960s saw the New 
Frontier and Great Society programs, which attempted to target those whom 
prosperity had left behind. These policies were designed to intervene in the 
market economy. Yet, after initial success in the mid- to late-1960s, poverty 
rates stopped responding to economic growth and the policies targeting it. 
While the Great Society programs emphasized equity, attention shifted in 
the mid-1970s to promoting more economic efficiency, partly in response to 
the decline in productivity and the stagnant economy of the late-1970s. 
A. Data on American Poverty 
Persistent poverty has been a major feature of the United States econ-
omy throughout the twentieth century. As of 2005, there were 37 million 
40. "Nothing is more useful than to look upon the world as it really is." Pope Leo Xlll, 
Rerum novarum, No. 18 (May 15, 1891), available at http://benedettoxvLvalholy_fatherlleo_xiii/ 
encyclicalsldocuments/hU-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum_en.htrnl. 
41. See generally Clark, supra note 13, at 6. 
42. NATIONAL HOUSING CONFERENCE, NHC's FIRST 75 YEARS 9 (2006), available at http:// 
www.nhc.orglpdf/pub_nhc75years.pdf. 
14 UNIVERSI1Y OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:1 
people who were classified as living below the poverty threshold.43 While 
high poverty rates were a common feature of all capitalist economies in the 
nineteenth century, poverty rates since World War II have fallen dramati-
cally in most capitalist countries, yet they clearly have fallen more in some 
countries than in others.44 Table 1 provides a comparison of poverty and 
income inequality in the United States and ten other advanced capitalist 
countries at the end of the twentieth century. Here we see that the United 
States has the highest level of relative poverty, child poverty, and income 
inequality, and the third highest level of elderly poverty. All of these coun-
tries are advanced capitalist economies with similar standards of living, thus 
they all have similar means for dealing with poverty. The lack of success in 
the United States is not due to a lack of means. 
Country 
Norway 2000 
Sweden 2000 
Belgium 2000 
France 1994 
Germany 2000 
Canada 2000 
UK 1999 
Italy 2000 
Australia 1994 
Ireland 2000 
USA 2000 
TABLE 145 
RATES OF RELATIVE POVERTY IN ELEVEN 
ADVANCED CAPITALIST EcONOMIES 
Elderly 
Poverty rate Child Poverty Poverty 
(50% of (50% of (50% of 
Median) Median) Median) 
6.4 3.4 11.9 
6.5 4.2 7.7 
7.7 7.8 13.7 
8.0 7.9 9.8 
8.3 9.0 10.1 
11.4 14.9 5.9 
12.4 15.3 20.5 
12.7 16.6 13.7 
14.3 15.8 29.4 
16.5 17.2 35.8 
17.0 21.9 24.7 
Income 
Distribution 
(Gini 
Coefficient) 
.251 
.252 
.277 
.288 
.264 
.302 
.318 
.333 
.311 
.323 
.368 
It is important to note that the above chart applies the same measure of 
poverty to each country. In contrast to most European countries, who mea-
sure poverty in relative terms, the Unites States' "official" measure of pov-
erty is an "absolute" measure, in which the poverty threshold (adjusted for 
43. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSING AND HOUSEHOLD EcONOMIC STATISTICS DrvISION, POV· 
ERTY: 2005 HIGHLIGHTS, http://www.census.govlhhes/www/poverty/poverty05/pov05hi.html (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2007). 
44. See ALBERTO ALESINA & EDWARD GLAESSER, FIGHTING PoVERTY IN THE US AND Eu. 
ROPE: A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE 1-54 (2006), for an analysis of the role of redistribution in 
poverty reduction. 
45. Data compiled from data available at Luxembourg Income Study, http://www.lisproject. 
org (last visited Mar. 26, 2007). 
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family size) is based on the cost of a basket of goods constructed in the 
early 1960s and adjusted each year for inflation.46 Many note that this mea-
sure systematically underestimates poverty levels, for it has not been ad-
justed for the major changes in the budget of poor families, as well as 
regional changes. Graph 1 shows how the official poverty rate has changed 
from 1959 to 2004. After falling steadily from 1959 to 1973, the poverty 
rate has fluctuated between eleven percent and fIfteen percent over the past 
thirty years. 
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GRAPH 1 
OFFICIAL POVERTY RATE, USA, 1959-2004 
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In Graph 2, we see the differences in poverty rates by age. While eld-
erly poverty has continued to fall throughout this time period, adult and 
child poverty rates, while fluctuating with the business cycle, have in-
creased slightly. 
GRAPH 2 
POVERTY RATES BY AGE, USA, 1959-2004 
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46. Charles M. A. Clark:, Does a Rising Tide Lift All Boats? How Poverty Iws Become Im-
mune to Economic Growth, available at http://www.vincenter.org/99/clark.html. In the 1960s it 
was estimated that one-third of a poor family's budget went for food, so they multiplied the food 
budget by three to get the poverty threshold; yet, other costs have risen much faster than food 
prices in the subsequent 40 years. 
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Graphs 3 and 4 indicate that there are very different experiences of 
poverty depending on both race and household structure. These are not indi-
vidual characteristics, but instead are social and historical factors (that is, 
they are not due solely or mostly to individual choices in the marketplace). 
This suggests that something other than market forces are operating here. 
GRAPH 3 
POVERTY RATES BY RACE, USA, 1974-2004 
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GRAPH 4 
POVERTY RATE OF FEMALE HEADED HOUSEHOLDS BY RACE, 
USA, 1974-2004 
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B. Poverty and Growth 
One of the most consistent aspects of our economy over the past three 
decades has been the inability of economic growth to significantly reduce 
poverty rates. From 1973 to 2001 real Gross Domestic Product (hereinafter 
"GDP") grew by 149% and real per capita GDP grew by 82%, while the 
official poverty rate experienced no real improvement-going from its all-
time low of 11.1 % in 1973 to 11.7% in 2001 (with 11.3% in 2000 being the 
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lowest level since 1973).47 For most of this time, as we see in Graph 1, the 
poverty rate fluctuated between 12% and 15%, showing no long-run trend 
downward (while there is a clear trend upward in GOP). This is in stark 
contrast to the period of 1959 to 1973 when real GOP grew by 78%, per 
capita GOP grew by 49%, and the official poverty rate declined in a steady 
fashion (with some expected increases due to recession) from 22% to 
11.1 %. The effect of economic growth on poverty rates can be seen in Ta-
ble 2, which looks at the relationship between changes in GOP and poverty 
rates over the business cycle since 1960. 
TABLE 248 
EFFECT OF ECONOMIC GROWTH ON POVERTY RATES, 
1960-2001 
Business 
Cycles 1960-1969 1969-1973 1973-1980 1981-1991 
Constant 18.337 12.816 12.100 14.092 
(5.083) (35.724) (40.420) (30.466) 
GDP Growth -0.1985 -0.2191 -0.1151 -0.0627 
(-0.2595) (-2.4845) (-1.5337) (-0.5303) 
R squared .0084 .6729 .2816 .0340 
Average 
Poverty Rate 17.46% 12.04% 11.76% 13.92% 
1991-2001 
13.591 
(17.078) 
-0.0759 
(-0.3079) 
.0093 
13.36% 
The coefficient for GOP growth indicates the impact of economic 
growth on the poverty rate (its negative sign indicates that as economic 
growth increases, poverty rates decrease). We can see that the coefficient 
for GOP growth declined significantly during the 1969-1973 business cy-
cles and again in the 1981-1991 business cycles, The slight increase in the 
1991-2001 business cycles is still one-third of the 1969-1973 level. The 
lack of success in reducing poverty rates via economic growth should cause 
us to rethink our anti-poverty policy. 
IV. CAUSES OF POVERTY 
After recognizing the extent of the problem of poverty, one must then 
look to its causes. How one explains the causes of poverty is greatly influ-
enced by the economic model one chooses. Neoclassical economic theory 
attempts to explain all economic actions and outcomes in terms of individ-
ual behavior (methodological individualism).49 This means that both this 
47. See US CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSING AND HOUSEHOLD EcONOMICS STASTISTICS DIVISION, 
HISTORICAL POVERTY TABLES, http://www.census.govlhhes/www/povertylhistpovlhistpovtb.html 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2(07). 
48. Parentheses indicate t-statistic. 
49. See CLARK, supra note 22, at 171-78. 
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phenomenon and its causes are understood in individualistic terms. The 
problem of poverty is recast as the problem of numerous poor individuals, 
with the primary cause of each individual's poverty being his or her indi-
vidual characteristics and choices. Non-neoclassical economists look at the 
poverty rate as an aggregate phenomenon, which is the outcome of eco-
nomic and non-economic forces and structures. 
In the real economy, poverty is the result of both individual and social 
factors, which are often impossible to separate. 50 We have seen above that 
some of the characteristics that are common in poor households, such as 
single-parent households, are the result of bad decisions. Yet, we need to 
remember that individual actions are socialized, and if we want to explain 
the frequency of actions we need to understand them in their social con-
text.51 Social institutions adjust and change due to the actions of individu-
als, just as individual actions are influenced by social institutions. Thus, 
poverty is the result of the interaction of individual choices, social institu-
tions, and structures. This does not explain all individual behavior, as each 
individual is a person with free will, but it allows us to see overall trends. 
People are poor, according to neoclassical economic theory, because 
they have low incomes (or assets that can be turned into income), and they 
have low incomes because they yield low rates of return for the factor ser-
vices they sell in the market. These factor services include, among other 
things: labor power, the use of land or natural resources, the use of produc-
tive capital, and the lending of capital. For obvious reasons, economists 
concentrate on why poor individuals receive low rates of return for their 
labor, as almost by definition a poor person is someone who does not own 
enough of the other factors of production to yield sufficient income. 
Most frequently, human capital theory is used to explain why poor 
people receive low income from their labor.52 Under human capital theory, 
an individual's income is determined by his or her skill level (human capi-
tal), which in tum is determined by past investments. Those with low levels 
of human capital are those who, in the past, chose current income over 
investing their time and money into training and education. According to 
this approach, labor incomes are based on choices and are thus deserved. 
Furthermore, neoclassical economic theory explains other forms of income 
(rent, interest, profits) with the same type of analysis-as rewards for past 
investments. 
Given that the neoclassical model assumes full employment as the 
norm, the existence of poor individuals is explained by their choices. This 
naturally leads to a policy approach that promotes changing individual be-
haviour. If one can influence the economic signals that poor individuals 
50. See generally Clark, supra note 13. 
51. [d. 
52. See BRADLEY R. SCHILLER, THE ECONOMICS OF POVERTY AND DISCRIMINATION 38-63 
(2003). 
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receive, then one can hope to change their responses to these signals. By 
raising the costs of bad choices, it is hoped that there will be fewer bad 
choices. 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
The effort to promote economic growth through helping the rich get 
richer (supply-side economics) has been the primary economic and anti-
poverty policy since 1980. Yet, as we saw in Table 2, economic growth has 
not had the same positive impact on reducing poverty it had in the previous 
forty years.53 Furthermore, since the 1980s and 1990s, conservative eco-
nomic opinion has argued that government intervention into the economy 
was a cause of poverty rather than a solution.54 The argument was that 
government programs caused the poor to become dependent on public as-
sistance, thus preventing them from learning the skills necessary for inde-
pendence and self-sufficiency. The idea behind welfare reform was to allow 
market signals to play a stronger role in leading the poor to change their 
behavior and raise themselves out of poverty. The logic of this policy is 
straight neoclassical economic theory-concentrated on individual actions 
and market signals. . 
By 1994, welfare spending had reached $22.8 billion ($12.5 from the 
federal government, $10.3 from state and local governments), with rising 
numbers of people on the welfare rolls.55 While the average length of time 
on public assistance was not very long, it was possible for some to remain 
on assistance indefinitely. Furthermore, there was the problem of in-
tergenerational dependence on public assistance. 56 
Interestingly, the legislation did not mention poverty reduction as a 
goal. 57 T ANF differed from AFDe by imposing time- and lifetime-benefit 
limits and work requirements, as well as increased funds for childcare 
(while also allowing for reductions in spending for needy children).58 A 
major goal of the new legislation was to reduce the number of children born 
to single women and living in single-parent households (i.e., promote mar-
riage), as well as to reduce dependency on welfare. 59 An essential aspect of 
the new policy was to allow for each state to experiment with different 
policies (within limits, such as the need to keep assistance spending at least 
53. See Clark, supra note 46. 
54. For an analysis and rejection of this thesis see BENJAMIN I. PAGE & JAMES R. SIMMONS, 
WHAT GOVERNMENT CAN Do: DEALING WITH POVERTY AND INEQUALITY (2000). 
55. H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 108TH CONG., 2004 GREEN BOOK 7-1-7-2 (Comm. 
Print 2004). 
56. See generally REBECCA BLANK, IT TAKES A NATION (1998). 
57. H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 55, at 7-4. 
58. [d. at 7-2-7-4. 
59. [d. 
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75% of pre-TANF levels).60 The legislation also included bonuses to states 
that showed progress in achieving these goals. 
VI. EVALUATING WELFARE REFORM AS AN ANTI-POVERTY PROGRAM 
There can be no denying that welfare rolls have shrunk since the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act was passed 
in 1996. How much of this decline is due to the replacing of AFDC with 
T ANF and how much is due to the expanding economy in combination with 
the increase in the Earned Income Tax Credit is a major debate amongst 
economists, but it is not our concern here. Even with the slowdown of the 
economy in 2000-2001, and the subsequent rise in poverty rates (from 
11.3% in 2000 to 12.7% in 2004), the numbers benefiting from public assis-
tance, and total spending on TANF, have continued to fall. The rise in the 
poverty rate-especially the increase in those in deep poverty (50% of the 
official poverty threshold), as well as the increased numbers participating in 
the Food Support Program (49.4%)61; Women, Infants, and Children (here-
inafter "WIC") (11.6%); and child nutrition (8.7%)62 programs-all demon-
strate that the needs of the poor have significantly increased since 2000. 
Yet, the main program designed to help these families (TANF) has contin-
ued to decrease its sUpport.63 
Common sense tells us that assistance programs should adjust to the 
needs they were designed to address, thus as the economy grows the wel-
fare rolls should shrink, and as the economy stagnates or decreases the 
numbers on welfare should increase. This has been the experience in the 
past, and it continues to be the experience with other anti-poverty programs. 
Thus, since the 1970s, AFDC caseloads went up and down at the same 
time, and in similar proportions, with the Food Support Program rolls.64 If 
TANF was designed to meet the needs of the poor, then TANF rolls should 
be much higher-about 50% higher-than they are currently. The evidence 
clearly shows that the needs of the poor since 2000-2001 have increased, 
yet there has been a steady decline in both caseloads adopted and spending 
on those caseloads. Thus, as an anti-poverty program-specifically, one 
that is designed to either help those in need or reduce the need for assis-
tance-the TANF experiment was not considered a success. 
60. [d. at 7-3. 
61. Fonnerly known as the Food Stamps program. 
62. The child nutrition programs include the National School Lunch Program, School Break-
fast Program, Summer Food Service Program, Child and Adult Care Food Program, and the Spe-
cial Milk Program, all of which are USDA programs. 
63. See supra fig.3. 
64. Blank, supra note 4, at 1138. 
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1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Year 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
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TABLE 365 
PuBLIC ASSISTANCE LEVELS, 1996-2005 
TANF 
Food Child 
Families Recipients Spending Stamps WIC Nutrition 
(Thousands) (Thousands) (Millions) (Thousands) (Thousands) (Millions) 
4,434 12,321 $31,931 25,543 7,186 4,313.2 
3,740 10.376 $25,569 22,858 7,407 4,409.0 
3.050 8,347 $23,473 19.791 7,367 4,425.0 
2,554 6.824 $22.747 18,183 7,311 4.513.6 
2,215 5,778 $23,335 17,194 7,192 4.575.2 
2,104 5.359 $24,543 17,318 7,306 4,584.8 
2,047 5,064 .35 19,096 7,491 4,716.8 
2,024 4,929 $22,856 21,259 7,631 4,763.1 
1,981 4,745 $20,863 23,858 7,904 4,841.8 
1,909 4,492 NA 25,682 8,023 4,973.2 
TABLE 466 
OFFICIAL POVERTY RATE AND DEEP POVERTY RATE, 
POST-WELFARE REFORM 
Median Family Income 
Official Poverty Rate Deep Poverty Rate ($2004) 
13.7% 5.4% $42,544 
13.3% 5.4% $43,430 
12.7% 5.1% $45,003 
11.9% 4.7% $46,129 
11.3% 4.5% $46,058 
11.7% 4.8% $45,062 
12.1% 4.9% $44,546 
12.5% 5.3% $44,482 
12.7% 5.4% $44,389 
65. U.S. Census Bureau, The 2007 Statistical Abstract: Social Insurance & Human Services, 
http://www.census.gov/compendialstatab/sociaUnsurance_human_services; USDA Food and 
Nutrition Service, Food Stamp Program Annual Summary, http://www.fns.usda.govlpd!fssummar. 
htrn; USDA Food and Nutrition Service, WIC Program Annual Summary. http://wwwJns.usda. 
govlpd!wisummary.htrn; USDA Food and Nutrition Service. National School Lunch Annual 
Summary, http://www.fns.usda.govlpdlslsummar.htrn. 
66. U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Poverty Tables: Poverty Status of People by Family 
Relationship, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1959 to 2005, http://www.census.govlhheslwww/ 
povertylhistpovlhstpov2.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2007) (Official Poverty Rate); U.S. Census 
Bureau, Historical Poverty Tables: Number and Percent of People Below 50 Percent of Poverty 
Level: 1975 to 2005, http://www.census.govlhhes/wwwlpovertylhistpovlhstpov22.htrnl (last 
visited Apr. 2. 2007) (Deep Poverty Rate); U.s. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND 
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The reason T ANF rolls have shrunk while need has increased is that 
the system for determining eligibility under T ANF is specifically designed 
to make it difficult to attain assistance. Part of this was a change in the 
rules, but part of it was also a change in attitudes toward the poor and the 
incentive structure to encourage caseload reductions at all costs. Some cities 
designed criteria that were even more difficult to meet than federal guide-
lines (and in some cases the courts had to intervene).67 To give an example, 
a common practice was to automatically deny benefits, or to impose a wait-
ing period, so that only the most persistent would receive assistance. Yet, 
even without the less-than-just methods of caseload reductions used, TANF, 
unlike AFDC, was established with the goal of reducing welfare caseloads 
and spending, with, at best, the hope that this harsher market signal would 
create a crisis in the lives of the poor, thus causing them to change their 
behavior believed to have caused their poverty. 
VII. ON THE JUSTICE AND PRUDENCE OF WELFARE REFORM 
Political policies need to be based on a clear understanding of the 
problems at hand and a clear vision of a just future toward which to work. 
Prudence and justice are the cornerstones of public policies that promote the 
common good. Yet, the conception of justice must be one that is centered 
on the common good, and the prudential judgment required is public pru-
dence, not simply ordinary or private prudence. The underlying concept of 
economic justice is based on self-interest and not the common good, as 
understood in the Catholic Social Thought tradition, or as it has been under-
stood in the classical philosophical tradition. Christian and Catholic concep-
tions of justice are based on the principle of the Preferential Option for the 
Poor, which calls for the evaluation of all economic policies and actions 
based on how they might affect the poor.68 
The welfare reform policy was based on an understanding of poverty 
that assumes that most, if not all, causes of poverty are individual, and thus 
the solution is to force poor individuals to change their behavior. This ig-
nores the fact that poverty is caused by both structural and individual fac-
tors. Higher poverty rates for African-Americans, Hispanics, women, and 
children indicate that there are structural factors to poverty, even if they are 
the lasting impact of past historical discrimination, which also needs to be 
accounted for. Moreover, many of the structural factors are cultural and/or 
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2004, at tbL A-I (2005), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prodl2005pubs/p60-229.pdf (Median Family Income). 
67. For example, in Reynolds v. Giuliani, No. 99-7254, 1999 WL 822512 (2d Cif. Sept. 28, 
1999), the Court ruled that New Y ofk City illegally discouraged applications for public assistance, 
using a policy of "diverting" applicants to decrease the city's welfare rolls. 
68. U.s. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Letter on Catho-
lic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy 'I 52 (1986), available at http://www.osjsm.orgleco-
nomic justicejor_aU.aspx. 
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social, and thus the behavior they produce will not be so easily changed by 
merely adjusting the market signals. While some will certainly respond as 
the policy-makers hope, we cannot expect that this will significantly reduce 
the extent of poverty. 
Furthermore, an important underlying assumption is that the economy 
has a tendency toward full employment. This produced an expectation that 
the increase in labor supply (due to the increase in labor market participa-
tion) will Itranslate into higher levels of employment and at wages high 
enough to IUft someone out of poverty. The evidence suggests that while 
many did find jobs, especially in the 1996-2000 period, only a small per-
centage f9und employment at wages that brought them out of poverty.69 
The bigge~t stumbling block to developing successful anti-poverty policies 
are the initial assumptions that: (1) economic outcomes are only the result 
of individtlal choices, and (2) that the market will generate employment for 
all at decent wages (that is, economic growth is necessary to significantly 
reduce the! extent of poverty in America). These two barriers are the result 
of economic theories that reduce the person to a mere "homo economicus" 
(thus deny~ng the human dignity of all individual persons) and which reject 
the social I nature of the human person (and thus the importance of 
SOlidarity1, Prud tial judgment requires both an understanding of the problem at hand and understanding of the common good toward which to work. The Welfare form Act of 1996 was based on an unrealistic and inaccurate 
understanding of both the human person and the economy. We should not 
be surpris,d that it did not promote the common good. 
69. The increased numbers in employment were not matched by a similar decrease in the 
numbers under the poverty threshold. 
